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Abstract. This paper examines the relation between country-level governance and cross-
country differences in equity market risk by employing panel data regressions. For emerg-
ing markets, we find consistent evidence that governance quality of various dimensions 
is negatively related to equity market risk. On the contrary, for developed markets, the 
results show that there is generally little or no relation between governance quality and 
equity market risk. The results provide practical implication to policy makers of emerg-
ing markets by highlighting the relevant governance dimensions that constitute important 
drivers of stock market risk. The findings have academic implication in the context of 
equilibrium pricing of stock market in emerging market.
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Introduction
The emergence of globalization has caused country-level governance to become one 
of the most important policy issues within the realm of finance. The occurrence of 
international financial crisis has strengthened the belief that governance quality plays 
significant role in influencing the financial system. It is widely believed that poor gov-
ernance quality hinders economic growth and financial development. In other words, 
good governance and institutions are certainly prerequisites for the development of 
financial markets. As defined by Kaufmann et al. (2010: 4), governance is “...the tra-
ditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes a 
process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; the capacity of 
the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect 
of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them”.
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Prior research has established that important interplay exists between governance 
mechanism at firm level and country-level governance framework. An assessment of 
corporate governance at firm level is an ideal starting point for regulators to have deep 
insights about the effect of country-level governance quality on stock market risk since 
both the governance mechanisms interact with each other and neither one is able to 
function properly on its own. Collectively, the available research find that the quality of 
country-level governance has profound impacts on corporate policies and the operation 
of financial markets through its influences on the availability of external financing, cost 
of capital, corporate valuations, stock market performance, and investment quality (Hail, 
Leuz 2006; Daouk et al. 2006; Hooper et al. 2009; Yartey 2010; Giannetti, Koskinen 
2010; Chiou et al. 2010; Low et al. 2011).
Studies that examine the relation between governance quality and equity returns have 
reached varied conclusions and attribute the findings to heightened investors’ concerns 
on investment risk. Hooper et al. (2009) find that good governance quality increases the 
demand on equity and thus maximizes stock returns through the reduction in transaction 
and agency costs. On the contrary, Low et al. (2011) provide evidence that on aver-
age, countries with weak governance framework characterized by political instability, 
poor investor protection, ineffective government, poor regulatory quality, and lack of 
control for corruption, exhibit higher equity returns than countries with strong govern-
ance settings.
In the present study, we examine the influence of a country’s governance quality on 
the variation in equity market risk in emerging and developed markets over the period 
from January 2002 to December 2009 using panel data regression. We employ the six 
governance dimensions of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
to measure the quality of a country’s governance framework. The findings of this study 
shed light on the relevant aspects of governance that constitute key drivers of equity 
market risk. This study is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the existing literature 
and Section 2 presents the data and methodology. Findings are discussed in Section 3 
and final section concludes the study. 
1. Literature review 
Prior studies have established that cross-country differences in governance framework 
have important implications. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) provide evidence that coun-
tries with better legal rules and efficient enforcement of laws have easier access to 
external funds in the financial markets and thus investors are more willing to invest in 
such countries than in those with poor investor protections. Similar insights are found 
in studies by Claessens et al. (2000), Berkowitz et al. (2003), Beck et al. (2003), Klap-
per and Love (2004), Lombardo and Pagano (2006), among others. The findings of 
Dumludag (2009) suggest that institutional governance is crucial in attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into Turkey. Institutional-related factors identified as barriers 
to FDI inflows are ineffective government, weak regulatory structure, poor enforcement 
in the rule of law and pervasiveness of corruption. There is a growing body of empiri-
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cal evidence indicating that understanding the impact of country-level governance on 
stock market risk is vital for determining cost of capital and facilitating asset allocation 
decisions. Hail and Leuz (2006) show that countries with effective securities regulations 
and strong supporting legal institutions have lower levels of cost of equity capital than 
those with inefficient regulations and legal systems. Chen et al. (2009) find that firm-
level governance is negatively related to cost of equity capital and the effect is more 
pronounced in poor investor protection countries. Daouk et al. (2006) find that effec-
tive insider trading laws enforcement, transparent accounting standards and relaxation 
of short selling restrictions are associated with good governance quality which reduces 
cost of capital, increases market liquidity and price efficiency all of which decreases 
investment risk. 
The nexus between governance and stock market is appealing given the mixed findings 
on the relation between governance and stock market returns most of which are attrib-
uted to heightened concerns on investment risk. Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) argue 
that countries with weak investor protection have lower returns due to lesser demand for 
the stocks. The findings of Gompers et al. (2003) indicate that firms with weak govern-
ance structures are associated with high agency costs leading to low stock valuations 
and returns. Hooper et al. (2009) show that governance quality measured by political 
stability is key governance dimension that positively affects international equity returns. 
On the contrary, Low et al. (2011) find evidence of significant negative link between 
governance quality and stock market returns. The findings indicate that poor governance 
quality increases stock market uncertainty and therefore accords higher equity returns 
to offset the higher risk borne by investors. 
Chiou et al. (2010) find that effective legal systems, low corruptions, strong inves-
tor protection rights, stable political environment reduce stock market risk. Aggarwal 
et al. (1999) find that high political risk and poor quality of institutions lead to greater 
stock market volatility and conclude that country-specific events are the key factors 
that increase stock market volatility in emerging countries. Such finding is in line with 
Harvey’s (1995) findings that stock markets in emerging countries have higher return 
volatility and larger risk premiums. Bialkowski et al. (2008) report that variance of 
stock market return increases considerably around national elections. Franck and Krausz 
(2009) find that unstable domestic political environments imply higher risk in stock 
markets. Eldor and Melnick (2004) show that terror attacks have lasting negative im-
pacts on equity market but not on currency market in Israel. Kim and Mei (2001) find 
that political risk has significant influence on stock market volatility. Chau et al. (2014) 
report that political chaos fuels stock market volatility in Middle East and North African 
countries. Charles and Darne (2014) reveal that wars, national elections, and terrorist 
attacks contribute to large volatility shocks in the United States stock market. 
In this study, we expand the literature by examining whether a country’s governance 
quality plays important role in explaining international differences in equity market 
risk. Our study is most closely related to Hooper et al.’s (2009) who find that stock 
markets in better governed countries have higher equity returns and lower risk levels. 
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They find that the governance quality as measured by voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of cor-
ruption are all significant and negatively associated with equity market risk. However, 
the investigation of stock market risk represents only a small section of the study and 
it did not examine the separate impacts of emerging versus developed countries. In this 
study, we enhance the understanding of the key governance dimensions that drive stock 
market risk using a longer sample period and separating the sample into emerging and 
developed market countries. 
2. Data and methodology
The study sample consists of 21 emerging markets and 24 developed markets with 
complete relevant data for the period from January 2002 to December 2009. The data on 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) country indices which are value-weighted 
national indices with dividend reinvestments are used to calculate international equity 
market risk as measured by standard deviation of equity return and semi-deviation of 
equity return. The proxies for country-level governance quality were sourced from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), available at www.govindica-
tors.org. The description of governance variables used in this study is summarized in 
Appendix A. The data on MSCI country index series, MSCI world stock market index, 
and US one-month T-bill were sourced from Datastream. We include four other global 
risk factors known to influence international equity market risk as employed by Low 
et al. (2011), Hooper et al. (2009), Hail and Leuz (2006), Mateus (2004), Ferson and 
Harvey (1993), and Dumas and Solnik (1995). The global risk factors are G7 inflation 
rate, crude oil spot price changes, G7 industrial production changes, and G10 exchange 
rate index changes. The data on inflation, crude oil, and industrial production were 
sourced from Datastream while the data on foreign exchange were retrieved from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
We employ two measures of stock market risk as dependent variables, i.e., standard 
deviation of equity return and semi-deviation of equity return as discussed in Estrada 
(2007) and given by Equation (1) and (2) respectively:
 
( )2 ,σ = − µ   it it itE R   (1)
 
( ){ }2 ,min ,0Σ = − µ  it it itE R   (2)
where Rit and it are returns and mean returns of each country i and for each year t re-
spectively. We first estimate the world beta for each country and for each year as shown 
in Equation (3): 
 ,( ) 1,..., ; 1,..., ,
RF WORLD W RF
it t it it t t itR R R R i N t T− = θ + β + ε = =−  (3)
where Rit is the return of country i’s MSCI equity index for week t; RRFt is the US 
1-month t-bill rate; RWt is the MSCI USD value-weighted world index for week t; 
bWORLDit
 is the world beta for country i and for time t; and qit and eit are the intercept 
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and error term of country i in period t. We regress equity market risk measure on 
governance indicators, world beta, and other global risk factors employing panel data 
regression model as shown in Equation (4):
 
, 1,... ; 1,..., ,
it it it it it
it it
it it it t t






e i N t T
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
γ β
= β + β + β + β + β +
σ σ σ σ σ
β + β + µ + = =
σ σ
       
              
       
   
      
     
(4)
where git is the equity market risk of country i for year t. The variable bWORLDit is the 
beta coefficient estimated from Equation (3) for country i and year t. The variables 
CPI, FOREX, OIL, and IPROD are global risk factors and they represent G7 inflation 
rate, G10 exchange rate index changes, crude oil spot price changes, and G7 industrial 
production changes respectively. The variable Git is governance score for each country 
in a given year and following the adjustment procedure of Hooper et al. (2009), we di-
vide each governance indicator by its respective standard error, sGit. Separate regression 
model for each of the governance indicator is employed to avoid the potential problem 
of multicollinearity problem due to high correlations among the governance indicators 
as reported in Appendix B. The vector b is the coefficient to be estimated; eit is the 
idiosyncratic error term; µi is the unobserved heterogeneity for country i, representing 
fixed effect if it is a fixed unknown parameter or random effect if it is a random vari-
able. We perform Hausman test to determine the appropriateness of the fixed effect and 
random effect model. 
3. Empirical findings and discussion
Table 1 provides summary statistics of equity returns and equity market risk by country 
for the period from January 2002 to December 2009. It is observed that emerging equity 
markets have higher average stock returns, are more volatile and generally have more 
risk on the downside than developed markets. On average, the standard deviation of 
equity returns for emerging markets is 3.56 percent as compared to the 2.84 percent for 
developed markets. Similarly, emerging equity markets also exhibit a slightly higher 
level of semi-deviation of equity return than the developed market. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for variables employed in the study. The average 
overall governance index for emerging markets is 0.0877 and 1.3861 for developed 
markets. The quality of governance as measured by Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence (G2) has the lowest governance score in both emerging and developed 
markets. Lowest average score on this indicator among the six governance indicators 
implies that political dimension deserves urgent policy attention of policy makers in 
both emerging and developed markets. In emerging equity markets, Regulatory Quality 
(G4) has the highest average governance score of 0.3365 and the corresponding aver-
age score for developed markets is 1.4615. In developed markets, the indicator Control 
of Corruption (G6) has the highest average score of 1.6606 suggesting that corruption 
activities seem to be minimal in developed countries. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of equity returns and risk by country  
from January 2002 – December 2009
Market and country Mean return Total risk Downside risk Skewness
Panel A: Emerging markets
Brazil 0.0045 0.0388 0.0279 –0.2535
Chile 0.0028 0.0249 0.0177 –0.6647
China 0.0041 0.0403 0.0283 –0.1226
Colombia 0.0067 0.0333 0.0239 –0.6354
Czech Republic 0.0038 0.0336 0.0245 –0.5677
Egypt 0.0071 0.0412 0.0295 –0.5627
Hungary 0.0030 0.0388 0.0279 –0.7200
India 0.0046 0.0343 0.0251 –0.4410
Indonesia 0.0059 0.0411 0.0285 –0.2931
Korea 0.0030 0.0372 0.0264 –0.0508
Malaysia 0.0017 0.0199 0.0139 –0.4402
Mexico 0.0040 0.0315 0.0227 –0.1971
Morocco 0.0020 0.0242 0.0173 –0.2818
Peru 0.0060 0.0420 0.0301 –0.2379
Philippines 0.0023 0.0335 0.0232 –0.2525
Poland 0.0021 0.0347 0.0240 0.0275
Russia 0.0044 0.0531 0.0370 1.4214
South Africa 0.0024 0.0289 0.0203 0.3185
Taiwan 0.0009 0.0323 0.0230 0.0135
Thailand 0.0032 0.0356 0.0255 –0.6958
Turkey 0.0040 0.0474 0.0325 0.3972
Panel B: Developed markets
Australia 0.0011 0.0205 0.0150 –0.8289
Austria 0.0014 0.0323 0.0240 –1.5537
Belgium –0.0006 0.0296 0.0220 –1.3207
Canada 0.0015 0.0237 0.0174 –0.5655
Denmark 0.0013 0.0274 0.0201 –1.0963
Finland –0.0007 0.0403 0.0285 –0.2177
France 0.0001 0.0283 0.0205 –0.8928
Germany 0.0004 0.0320 0.0228 –0.3815
Greece 0.0002 0.0335 0.0236 –0.2931
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Market and country Mean return Total risk Downside risk Skewness
Hong Kong 0.0017 0.0286 0.0197 –0.1775
Ireland –0.0021 0.0358 0.0264 –1.2026
Israel 0.0022 0.0280 0.0202 –0.4405
Italy –0.0003 0.0268 0.0203 –1.5209
Japan 0.0001 0.0286 0.0206 –0.8444
Netherlands –0.0001 0.0303 0.0225 –1.3863
New Zealand 0.0000 0.0190 0.0138 –0.7710
Norway 0.0020 0.0336 0.0251 –0.8296
Portugal 0.0001 0.0226 0.0162 –1.1206
Singapore 0.0017 0.0278 0.0192 0.0039
Spain 0.0013 0.0279 0.0206 –1.1075
Sweden 0.0010 0.0316 0.0226 –0.5079
Switzerland 0.0005 0.0254 0.0183 –0.9447
UK 0.0004 0.0239 0.0173 –0.9105
USA 0.0003 0.0241 0.0171 –0.5463
Mean of emerging markets 0.0037 0.0356 0.0252 –0.2018
Mean of developed markets 0.0006 0.0284 0.0206 –0.8107
Table 3 and Table 4 report findings of the relationships between governance quality and 
equity market risk using two equity market risk measures as dependent variables, i.e., 
standard deviation and semi-deviation of equity return respectively. In all regression 
models in Tables 3 and 4, the reported t-statistics are corrected for country-specific het-
eroskedasticity. The Hausman test statistics are not significant in all regression models, 
suggesting that the application of random effect model is more appropriate than fixed ef-
fect model. In addition, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test also confirms 
that the random effect model is a preferred model. Hence, random effect models are 
applied in all regression specifications. In Table 3, the dependent variable employed the 
standard deviation of a country’s MSCI returns. For emerging equity markets, the results 
show that country-level governance are important drivers of equity market risk. The six 
regression models have R-squared values that range from 0.53 to 0.70 and the results 
show that the quality of governance as measured by Voice and Accountability (G1), Politi-
cal Stability and Absence of Violence (G2), Government Effectiveness (G3), Regulatory 
Quality (G4), Rule of Law (G5), and Control of Corruption (G6) are all negatively and 
significantly related to total equity market risk after controlling for exposures to common 
world factors. Our findings suggest that country-level governance risks are important 
components of equity market risk in emerging markets. For developed equity markets, 
interestingly, in all regression models 1 through 6, we find that none of the six governance 
indicators is significant in explaining the cross-sectional variation in equity market risk. 
End of Table 1
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics from January 2002 through December 2009























































Total risk 0.0356 0.0141 0.0326 0.0121 0.1165 0.0284 0.0135 0.0250 0.0104 0.0804














0.3038 0.5410 0.1532 –0.6038 1.3088 1.6091 0.4171 1.7115 0.3329 2.2672
Regulatory 
quality (G4)
0.3365 0.5657 0.2752 –0.6556 1.5871 1.4615 0.3024 1.5406 0.5368 1.9922
Rule of law 
(G5)




–0.0128 0.5627 –0.1403 –1.1219 1.5632 1.6606 0.5584 1.8274 0.0548 2.4666
Overall 
governance
0.0877 0.5793 –0.0681 –0.9199 1.2644 1.3861 0.3548 1.4635 0.4895 1.9006
Global risk factors
bWORLD 0.8389 0.5085 0.8360 –0.2261 2.0586 0.9266 0.3137 0.9553 0.0286 1.8424
CPI 0.0188 0.0091 0.0210 –0.0010 0.0318 0.0188 0.0091 0.0210 –0.0010 0.0318
FOREX –0.0411 0.0491 –0.0330 –0.1308 0.0429 –0.0411 0.0491 –0.0330 –0.1308 0.0429
OIL 1.7288 24.4034 4.1500 –55.2400 34.8500 1.7288 24.3943 4.1500 –55.2400 34.8500
IPROD –0.0084 0.0546 0.0158 –0.1432 0.0279 –0.0084 0.0546 0.0158 –0.1432 0.0279
Notes: The equity market risk measures are: total risk, calculated as the standard deviation in equity 
returns; downside risk or semi-deviation is the downside standard deviation in equity returns. G1 
through G6 are the six governance indicators measuring various dimensions of country-level gover-
nance. bWORLD is the world beta coefficient and it captures sensitivity of country i’s equity return to 
world market movement. The variables CPI, FOREX, OIL, and IPROD are other global risk factors 
as represented by inflation rate, foreign exchange rate, crude oil spot price changes, and industrial 
production growth respectively. 
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Table 3. Panel regression of equity market risk on governance variables and global risk factors 
over the period January 2002 – December 2009 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )









































































R-squared 0.6961 0.5739 0.5312 0.5855 0.6020 0.6575
Hausman test 3.35[0.76] 2.56[0.77] 1.81[0.87] 2.82[0.73] 2.49[0.78] 9.29[0.10]
LM test 32.91[0.00] 32.77[0.00] 23.18[0.00] 42.02[0.00] 41.86[0.00] 28.30[0.00]









































































R-squared 0.8396 0.7915 0.7599 0.7677 0.7911 0.7848 
Hausman test 2.12[0.83] 5.05[0.41] 1.74[0.88] 8.42[0.21] 1.44[0.92] 3.70[0.59]
LM test 20.54[0.00] 22.74[0.00] 29.14[0.00] 35.23[0.00] 24.56[0.00] 29.02[0.00]
Notes: Dependent variable is total risk. Panel A and Panel B report the estimation results for emerg-
ing and developed markets respectively. Gi represents the six governance indicators as follows: G1 is 
Voice and Accountability; G2 is Political Stability and Absence of Violence; G3 is Government Ef-
fectiveness; G4 is Regulatory Quality; G5 is Rule of Law; and G6 is Control of Corruption. bWORLD 
is the world beta coefficient and it captures sensitivity of country i’s equity return to world market 
movement. The variables CPI, FOREX, OIL, and IPROD are other global risk factors as represented 
by inflation rate, foreign exchange rate, crude oil spot price changes, and industrial production growth 
respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. p-
values are in square brackets. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels 
respectively.
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This evidence is in sharp contrast to the findings reported for emerging market countries 
where all six governance dimensions play significant roles in explaining the cross-
country differences in equity market risk. While none of the governance indicators is 
significant, the R-squared values of 0.76 to 0.84 are consistently higher than those of the 
emerging markets. The extremely high significant coefficients of world beta, exchange 
rate, crude oil price and industrial production risk factors suggest that cross-country 
differences in equity market risk of developed markets are primarily induced by world 
market movement and global risk factors. 
In Table 4, the dependent variable employed is semi-deviation of a country’s MSCI 
returns. For emerging equity markets, the results are very similar to those obtained 
using the standard deviation of equity return. The quality of a country’s governance 
framework is shown to have profound influence on its equity market risk even after 
controlling for the effects of world market movement and global risk factors. The re-
sults for developed markets in Panel B show that the two dimensions of a country’s 
governance framework deemed particularly important in influencing equity market risk 
are Government Effectiveness (G3) and Regulatory Quality (G4). This suggests that 
semi-deviation of equity return is able to capture a country’s risk exposure related to 
ineffective government and low regulatory quality.
In sum, the overall findings suggest that investors in emerging markets need to pay 
more attention to a country’s governance framework than do investors in developed 
markets. Governance-related risk is considered an important risk exposure and thus 
can potentially serve as an additional risk factor in the pricing model of stock market 
in emerging markets countries. 
Conclusions
This paper investigates the link between the quality of country-level governance and eq-
uity market risk in developed and emerging countries over the period from January 2002 
to December 2009 employing balanced panel data regressions. The two equity market 
risk measures employed are standard deviation of equity return and semi-deviation of 
equity return. For emerging market countries, our findings indicate that country-level 
governance risks are important drivers of equity market risk. The quality of governance 
measured by Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption 
are important drivers of stock market risk. Emerging market countries with lower scores 
on these governance dimensions have higher stock market risk than those with better 
governance scores. On the contrary, the results for developed equity markets show that 
none of the country-specific governance indicators is able to explain the cross-sectional 
differences in equity risk using standard deviation of equity return measure. However, 
when semi-deviation of equity return is employed as the risk measure, two governance 
dimensions, namely Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality are significant 
in explaining the cross-country differences in stock market risk of developed countries. 
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Table 4. Panel regression of equity market risk on governance variables and global risk factors 
over the period January 2002 – December 2009
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )









































































R-squared 0.7311 0.6164 0.5799 0.6198 0.6382 0.6987
Hausman test 2.22[0.90] 1.93[0.86] 1.49[0.91] 1.13[0.95] 0.81[0.98] 6.23[0.28]
LM test 48.50[0.00] 45.11[0.00] 30.88[0.00] 55.52[0.00] 58.53[0.00] 41.60[0.00]









































































R-squared 0.8399 0.7942 0.7627 0.7690 0.7928 0.7895
Hausman test 2.54[0.77] 3.48[0.63] 2.82[0.73] 10.28[0.11] 7.63[0.19] 2.37[0.80]
LM test 21.15[0.00] 21.51[0.00] 26.60[0.00] 29.62[0.00] 22.23[0.00] 23.54[0.00]
Notes: Dependent variable is downside risk. Panel A and Panel B report the estimation results for 
emerging and developed markets respectively. Gi represents the six governance indicators as follows: 
G1 is Voice and Accountability; G2 is Political Stability and Absence of Violence; G3 is Government 
Effectiveness; G4 is Regulatory Quality; G5 is Rule of Law; and G6 is Control of Corruption. bWORLD 
is the world beta coefficient and it captures sensitivity of country i’s equity return to world market 
movement. The variables CPI, FOREX, OIL, and IPROD are other global risk factors as represented 
by inflation rate, foreign exchange rate, crude oil spot price changes, and industrial production growth 
respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. p-
values are in square brackets. ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels 
respectively.
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Overall, the findings for developed countries suggest that there is generally little or no 
relation between country-level governance quality and stock market risk. Insights from 
this study are useful in providing policy directions to address the broader governance 
agenda in emerging market countries and enhance the academic literature on the various 
governance-related factors that are important in driving stock market risk of emerging 
market countries.
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APPENDIX A
Definitions of six dimensions of governance indicators
1. Voice and Accountability – capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, free-
dom of association, and a free media. 
2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence – capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, includ-
ing politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
3. Government Effectiveness – capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. 
4. Regulatory Quality – capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector develop-
ment. 
5. Rule of Law – capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
6. Control of Corruption – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “cap-
ture” of the state by elites and private interests.
Adapted from Kaufmann et al. (2010: 4).
APPENDIX B
Correlation coefficients
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6
Panel A: Emerging markets
G1 1
G2 0.614** 1
G3 0.651** 0.804** 1
G4 0.787** 0.788** 0.880** 1
G5 0.661** 0.833** 0.898** 0.836** 1
G6 0.737** 0.783** 0.890** 0.925** 0.883** 1
Panel B: Developed markets
G1 1
G2 0.336** 1
G3 0.256** 0.558** 1
G4 0.091 0.507** 0.797** 1
G5 0.421** 0.622** 0.883** 0.792** 1
G6 0.273** 0.572** 0.915** 0.850** 0.933** 1
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Correlation coefficients of country-level governance variables for emerging and devel-
oped markets are reported. G1: Voice and Accountability; G2: Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence; G3: Government Effectiveness; G4: Regulatory Quality; G5: Rule 
of Law; and G6: Control of Corruption. ** and * imply statistical significance at the 1 
percent and 5 percent levels respectively.
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